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Abstract
Splitting a secret s between several participants, we generate (for each value of s) shares for all
participants. The goal: authorized groups of participants should be able to reconstruct the secret
but forbidden ones get no information about it. In this paper we introduce several notions of non-
perfect secret sharing, where some small information leak is permitted. We study its relation to the
Kolmogorov complexity version of secret sharing (establishing some connection in both directions)
and the effects of changing the secret size (showing that we can decrease the size of the secret and
the information leak at the same time).
1 Secret sharing: a reminder
Assume that we want to share a secret – say, a bit string x of length n – between two people in such
a way that they can reconstruct it together but none of them can do this in isolation. This is simple,
choose a random string r of length n and give r and r ⊕ x to the participants (r ⊕ x is a bitwise xor of
x and r.) Both r and r ⊕ x in isolation are uniformly distributed among all n-bit strings, so they have
no information about x.
The general setting for secret sharing can be described as follows. We consider some finite set K
whose elements are called secrets. We also have a finite set P of participants. An access structure is a
non-empty set Γ whose elements are groups of participants, i.e., a non-empty subset of 2P . Elements
of Γ are called authorized groups of participants (that should be able to reconstruct the secret). Other
subsets of P are called forbidden groups (that should get no information about the secret). We always
assume that Γ is upward-closed (it is natural since a bigger group knows more)1.
In our initial example K = Bn (the set of n-bit strings), P = {1, 2} (we have two participants labeled
1 and 2), and Γ consists of the set {1, 2} only.
In general, perfect secret sharing can be defined as follows. For every participant p ∈ P a set Sp is
fixed; its elements are p’s shares. For every k ∈ K we have a tuple of #P dependent random variables
σp ∈ Sp. There are two conditions:
• for every authorized set A ∈ Γ it is possible to reconstruct uniquely the secret k from the shares
given to participants in A (i.e., for different secrets k and k′ the projections of the corresponding
random tuples onto the A-coordinates have disjoint ranges);
• for every forbidden set B /∈ Γ the participants in B get no information about the secret (i.e., for
different secrets k and k′ the projections of the corresponding random tuples onto B-coordinates
are identically distributed).
Various versions of combinatorial schemes were introduced in [6] and [7]. Note that in this definition
we have no probability distribution on the set of secrets. It is natural for the setting when somebody
gives us the secret (i.e., the user chooses her password) and we have to share whatever is given to us.
We consider another setting (as, first in [12] and further developed in [8]) where secret is also a
random variable. Consider a family of random variables: one (κ) for the secret and one (σp) for each
participant p. This family is a perfect secret sharing scheme if
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1One can also consider a more general setting where some groups are neither allowed nor forbidden (so there is no
restriction on the information they may get about the secret.) We do not consider this more general setting here.
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• for every authorized set A the projection σA = {σp, p ∈ A} determines κ;
• for every forbidden set B the projection σB is independent with κ.
These conditions can be rewritten using Shannon information theory: the first condition says that
H(κ|σA) = 0, and the second says that I(σB : κ) = 0. Here H(·|·) stands for conditional Shannon
entropy and I(· : ·) stands for mutual information. (To be exact, we should ignore events of probability
zero when saying that σA determines κ. To avoid these technicalities, let us agree that our probability
space is finite and all non-empty events have positive probabilities.)
These definitions are closely related. Namely, it is easy to see that:
• Assume that a perfect secret sharing scheme in the sense of the first definition is given. Then for
every distribution on secrets (random variable κ ∈ K) we get a scheme in the sense of the second
definition as follows. For each secret k ∈ K we have a family of dependent random variables σp,
and we use them as conditional distribution of participants’ shares if κ = k.
• Assume that a perfect secret sharing scheme in the sense of the second definition is given, and all
secrets have positive probability according to κ. Then the conditional distributions of σp with the
condition κ = k form a scheme in the sense of the first definition.
This equivalence shows that in the second version of the definition the distribution on secrets is
irrelevant (as far as all element in K have positive probability): we can change κ keeping the conditional
distributions, and still have a perfect secret sharing scheme. The advantage of the second definition is
that we can use standard techniques from Shannon information theory (e.g., information inequalities).
The general task of secret sharing can now be described as follows: given a set of secrets K and an
access structure Γ construct a secret sharing scheme. This is always possible (see [5, 11]). However,
the problem becomes much more difficult if we limit the size of shares. It is known (see [8]) that in
the non-degenerate case shares should be at least of the same size as the secret: #Sp ≥ #K for every
essential participant p. (A participant is essential if we remove it from some authorized group and get
a forbidden group. Evidently, non-essential participants can be just ignored.) This motivates the notion
of ideal secret sharing scheme where #Sp = #K for every essential participant p.
Historically, the motivating example for secret sharing was Shamir’s scheme (see [19]). It has n
participants, authorized groups are groups of t or more participants (where t is an arbitrary threshold).
Secrets are elements of a finite field F of size greater than n. To share a secret k, we construct a
polynomial
Pk(x) = k + r1x+ r2x
2 + . . .+ rt−1x
t−1
where the ri are chosen independently and uniformly. The shares are the values P (x1), . . . , P (xn) for dis-
tinct nonzero field elements x1, . . . , xn (for each participant a non-zero element of the field is fixed). Any
t participants together can reconstruct the polynomial while for any t− 1 participants all combinations
of shares are equally probable (for every k). This scheme is ideal.
Not every access structure allows an ideal secret sharing scheme. For example, no ideal scheme
exists for four participants a, b, c, d where the authorized groups are {a, b}, {b, c} and {c, d} and all their
supersets (see [5, 13]; it is shown there that every secret sharing scheme for this access structure satisfies
log#Sb + log#Sc ≥ 3 log#K).
It is therefore natural to weaken the requirements a bit and to allow non-ideal secret sharing schemes
still having shares of reasonable size. For example, we may fix some ρ ≥ 1 and ask whether for a given
access structure there exists a perfect secret sharing scheme where maxp∈P log#Sp ≤ ρ log#K. (The
answer may depend on the size of K.)
Unfortunately, not much is known about this. There are quite intricate lower bounds for different
specific access structures (some proofs are based on non-Shannon inequalities for entropies of tuples of
random variables, see [4, 17]). The best known lower bounds for sharing m-bit secrets (for some fixed
access scheme) are still rather weak, like nlog nm (see [9]). On the other hand, the known upper bounds for
general access structures are exponential in the number of participants (and rather simple, see [5, 11]).
2 Nonperfect secret sharing
The relaxation of the perfectness property is natural when efficiency is involved (see [2, 14, 20]). Our
attempt here is to encapsulate existing definitions of non-perfect schemes in the Shannon framework.
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We consider possible relaxations of the requirements and introduce several versions of almost-perfect
secret sharing. By this we mean that we allow limited “leaks” of information to forbidden groups of
participants. We also consider schemes where authorized groups need some (small) additional information
to reconstruct the secret. Such approximately-perfect schemes are quite natural from the practical point
of view. Also, the gain in flexibility may help overcome the difficulty of constructing efficient perfect
schemes which seems related to difficult problems of combinatorial or algebraic nature.
Let us discuss possible definitions for almost-perfect schemes. Now we want to measure the leak of
information (or the amount of missing information), and the most natural way is to replace the equations
H(κ|σA) = 0 and I(σB : κ) = 0 by inequalities H(. . .) < ε1 and I(. . .) < ε2, for some bounds ε1 and ε2
(normally, a small fraction of the amount of information in the secret itself).
The problem here is that measuring the information leak and missing information in this way, we
need to fix some distribution on secrets, and this looks unavoidable even from the intuitive point of view.
Imagine that we have 1000-bit secrets, and the sharing scheme works badly for secrets with 900 trailing
zeros (e.g., discloses them to all participants). If the information leak might not be huge for the uniform
distribution, since 100 leaked bits are multiplied by 2−900 probability to have 900 trailing zeros; it can
however become significant if the secret is not chosen uniformly, e.g. the user chooses a short password
padded with trailing zeros.
An interesting question (that we postpone for now) is how significant could be this dependence. One
may expect that a good secret sharing scheme remains almost as good if we change slightly the distri-
bution, but we cannot prove any natural statement of this kind. So we have to include the distribution
on secrets in all the definitions.
Let Γ be an access structure. Let κ and σp (for all participants p) be some random variables (on
the same probability space, so we may consider their joint distribution). Such a family is called a (not
necessarily perfect) secret sharing scheme, and its parameters are:
• distribution on secrets (in particular, the entropy of κ is important);
• information rate, H(κ), the entropy of the secret divided by the maximal entropy of a single share;
• missing information ratio, the maximal value of H(κ|σA) for all authorized A, divided by H(κ);
• information leak ratio, the maximal value of I(σB : κ) for all forbidden B, divided by H(κ).
To simplify our statements, we consider asymptotic behaviors and give the following template defi-
nition of almost-perfect secret sharing:
Definition 2.1. An access structure Γ on the set P of participants can be almost-perfectly implemented
with parameters (ρ, ε1, ε2) if there exists a sequence of secret sharing schemes for the secret variable κn,
such that
• H(κn)→∞;
• the lim sup of the information rates does not exceed ρ;
• the missing information ratio converges to ε1 as n→∞;
• the information leak ratio converges to ε2 as n→∞.
In this article we introduce several definitions of almost-perfect secret sharing schemes. Two versions
in the framework of Shannon entropy for which we show that the stronger definition, where we require
no missing information, gives the same notion; one version in the framework of Kolmogorov complexity.
We prove that all these approaches are asymptotically equivalent (have equivalent asymptotical rates of
schemes for each access structure). Hence, we can combine tools of Shannon’s information theory and
Kolmogorov complexity to investigate the properties of nonperfect secret sharing schemes.
Rather than providing constructions or stating trivial counterparts of known theorems, we emphasize
our study on the behaviour of such schemes. Simple properties of perfect schemes provide new natural
questions for nonperfect schemes which are in general not trivial. The main contribution of the paper
is the proof of few of such natural properties, namely and Proposition 2.6 and Theorem 4.3 for scaling
down a nonperfect scheme while keeping roughly the same information leak ratio.
We believe our modest contribution is a small step towards a promising path to discover new con-
structions and theorems in nonperfect secret sharing.
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2.1 Definitions
We consider two different versions of the definition of approximately-perfect secret sharing schemes. In
the first one, non-perfect secret sharing schemes are allowed to give some information to forbidden groups
and/or not give authorized groups the entire secret:
Definition 2.2. Let K be a finite set of secrets, a (ε1, ε2)-nonperfect secret sharing scheme for se-
crets in K implementing an access structure Γ is a tuple of jointly distributed discrete random variables
(κ, σ1, . . . , σn) such that
• if A ∈ Γ then H(κ|σA) ≤ ε1H(κ)
• if B /∈ Γ then I(κ : σB) ≤ ε2H(κ)
In this definition, authorized groups may fail to recover at most ε1 bits of the secret while forbidden
groups can not learn more than ε2 bits. A probably more natural version of a non-perfect scheme is
asymmetric: authorized groups know everything about the secret, while forbidden groups can keep not
more than ε bits of information about the secret:
Definition 2.3. Let K be a finite set of secrets, a ε-nonperfect secret sharing scheme for secrets in K im-
plementing an access structure Γ is a tuple of jointly distributed discrete random variables (κ, σ1, . . . , σn)
such that
• if A ∈ Γ then H(κ|σA) = 0
• if B /∈ Γ then I(κ : σB) ≤ εH(κ)
By ε-NPS(Γ, N, S), resp. (ε1, ε2)-NPS(Γ, N, S), we refer to a ε-nonperfect, resp. (ε1, ε2)-nonperfect,
secret sharing scheme implementing access structure Γ for N -bit secrets with single shares of entropy at
most S. We use PS(Γ, N, S) for perfect schemes, i.e., when it is the case that ε1 and ε2 are null.
We now introduce the almost-perfect versions of secret sharing, that denotes an asymptotic sequence
of nonperfect schemes for a fixed access structure where the leak can be made negligible as the size of
the secret grows.
Definition 2.4. We say that an access structure Γ can be almost-perfectly implemented, with parame-
ters (ρ, ε1, ε2), if there exists a sequence of nonperfect schemes in the sense of Definition 2.2 such that
parameters converge to (ρ, ε1, ε2). i.e., if
∃((ε1m, ε
2
m)-NPS(Γ, Nm, Sm))m∈N s.t. (ε
1
m, ε
2
m)→ (ε1, ε2) and
Nm
Sm
→ ρ as m→∞
Moreover, we say that Γ can be almost-perfectly implemented without missing information when the
nonperfect schemes are in the sense of Definition 2.3.
Proposition 2.5. Let Γ be an access structure and ρ be a positive real, the following are equivalent
• Γ can be almost-perfectly implemented
• Γ can be almost-perfectly implemented without missing information.
This proposition is a corollary of the following result: one can transform a scheme with some missing
information into a scheme without missing information by increasing the size of shares.
The natural idea to prove this is to add the missing information to authorized groups. However this is
already not trivial to implement. Indeed, we want to keep the leak small, hence we can not use a perfect
scheme to share the missing information. The plan is to "materialize" the missing information and add
it to each participant. The small amount of information will therefore also increase the information leak
by a small amount. The proposition tells us that we can indeed achieve a new leak comparable to the
previous one.
Proposition 2.6. If Γ is an access structure on n participants, then
∃(ε1, ε2)-NPS(Γ, N, S)⇒ ∃(ε2 +O(ε1N2
n))-NPS(Γ, N, S +O(ε1N2
n))
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Proof. Assume there is a (ε1, ε2)-NPS(Γ, N, S), let us transform it as follows. Take a minimal
authorized set A ∈ Γ−, by definition it holds that H(κ|σA) ≤ ε1N . Informally, it means that A lacks
ε1N bits of information about the secret. We materialize this information and add it to A. More
precisely, we use the following lemma about conditional descriptions:
Lemma 2.7. Let α and β be two random variables defined on the same space. Then there exists a
variable γ (defined on the same space) such that H(α|β, γ) = 0 and H(γ) ≤ 2H(α|β) +O(1).
Proof. Let β be distributed on a set {b1, . . . , bs}. For each fixed value bj, we have a conditional
distribution on values of α given the condition β = bj . We can construct for this conditional distribution
on values of α a prefix-free binary code c1j , . . . , cmj such that the average length of codewords is at most
H(α|β = bj) + 1 (e.g., we can take Huffman’s code).
Let γ be the corresponding codeword: if β = bj and α = ai then γ = cij (the i-th codeword from the
code constructed for the distribution of α under condition β = bj).
Given a value bj of β and a codeword cij from the corresponding code, we can uniquely determine
the corresponding value of α. Hence, we get H(α|β, γ) = 0. It remains to estimate entropy of γ.
The defined above γ ranges over the union of all codewords cij (from all codes constructed for all
possible values of β). The average length of bit strings cij
Eij |cij | = Ei(Ej |cij |) < Ei(H(α|β = bj) + 1) = H(α|β = bj) + 1.
This observation is enough to estimate the entropy of γ.
The union of all codewords cij is not necessarily prefix-free even if the codes {c1j , . . . , cmj} were
prefix-free for each value of β. However, we can convert any set of bit strings into a prefix-free code by
a simple transformation: we double each bit in each string, and add at the end of each string the pair
of bits 01. E.g., a string 00101 is converted into 000011001101. This simple trick converts the set of cij
into a prefix-free set c′ij such that
Eij |c
′
ij | = 2Eij |cij |+ 2
Thus, random variable γ can be considered as a distribution on this prefix-free set c′ij . It is well
known that for any distribution on a prefix-free set, the entropy is not greater than the average length
of codewords (it follows from Kraft’s inequality). Hence, entropy of γ is not greater than the average
length of c′ij , i.e., not greater than 2H(α|β) +O(1).
We apply lemma 2.7 to encode the secret k conditional to the shares of A. Since this random variable
has entropy at most ε1N , the encoding can be done by strings of size at most O(ε1N) +O(1). We add
this “conditional description” to any participant of A. Now the participants of A can together determine
the secret uniquely. We do the same for all minimal authorized groups in Γ−. So, now all authorized
groups have all information about the secret.
We added some additional data to several participants (some participants can obtain several differ-
ent “conditional descriptions” since one participant can belong to several minimal authorized groups).
However all additional information given to participants is of size only O(ε1N2
n), hence, the extra in-
formation is given to forbidden groups is at most O(ε1N2
n). The size of the shares in the new schemes
is at most S +O(ε1N2
n), and we are done.
An interesting open question about almost-perfect secret sharing is to settle whether it is equivalent
to perfect secret sharing or not:
Question 2.8. Can we achieve essentially better information rates with almost-perfect schemes than
with perfect schemes ?
A weaker form of this question where leaks are exactly zero has been answered by Beimel et al in [3]
(using a result of Matúš [16]) where they construct a nearly-ideal access structure, i.e. access structure
that can be implemented perfectly with an information rate as close to 1 as we want but not equal. In
fact, with the same kind of arguments we can construct an almost-perfect scheme for the same access
structure with small leaks but information rate exactly one.
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Proposition 2.9. There is an access structure which can be implemented by an almost-perfect scheme
with parameters (1, 0, 0) and rate exactly one but has no ideal perfect scheme.
Proof. An access structure Γ is induced by a matroid M = (Q, C) through s ∈ Q if Γ is defined
on the set of participants P = Q \ {s} by the upper closure of the collection of subsets A ⊆ P such
that A ∪ {s} ∈ C (here C is the set of circuits of the matroid M.) Let F and F− be respectively the
access structures induced by the Fano and by the non-Fano matroids (through any point). In [16], Matúš
proved that there exist perfect ideal schemes for F , resp. F− if and only if #K is even, resp. odd.
Consider an access structure Γ consisting of disjoint copies of F and F−. From Matúš argument, Γ
cannot be implemented ideally by a perfect scheme. Construct a scheme Σ consisting of the concatenation
of two independent schemes:
• a PS(F , N,N), and
• a PS(F−, N,M), constructed from a PS(F−,M,M) for #K = 2N + 1 (i.e., M = log(2N + 1))
where we removed one possible value of the secret.
Σ is a perfect scheme for Γ with rate Nlog(2N+1) . Now instead of using a PS(F
−, N,M) as second
scheme, we modify it into a nonperfect scheme by substituting the value of the share "2N + 1" by any
other possible value. Now there are exactly 2N shares. It is not difficult to show that Σ′ is, at most, a
( 3N , 0)-NPS(Γ, N,N) i.e., with information rate exactly one.
3 Kolmogorov secret sharing
We denote "the" Kolmogorov complexity function by the letter K. Since most variants are equal up to a
logarithmic term and our results are asymptotic. For a complete introduction to Kolmogorov complexity
and to some techniques used here, we refer the reader to the book [15] and to [21].
The problem of secret sharing could be studied also in the framework of the algorithmic information
theory. The idea is that now a secret sharing scheme is not a distribution on binary strings but an
individual tuple of binary strings with corresponding properties of “secrecy”. To define these “secrecy”
properties for individual strings, we substitute Shannon’s entropy by Kolmogorov complexity and get
algorithmic counterparts of the definition of secret sharing schemes. A similar idea was realized in
Definition 21 (part 1) in [1] for a special case (for threshold access structures).
For Kolmogorov complexity there is no natural way to define an "absolutely" perfect version of secret
sharing scheme. Thus, in the framework of Kolmogorov complexity we can deal only with “approximately-
perfect” versions of the definition. We define approximately-perfect secret sharing schemes for Kol-
mogorov complexity just in the same way as we defined (ε1, ε2)-nonperfect schemes for Shannon’s entropy
(similarly to Definition 2.2):
Definition 3.1. For an access structure Γ we say that a tuple of binary strings (s, a1, . . . , an) is a
Kolmogorov (ε1, ε2)-perfect secret sharing scheme for secrets of size N if
• K(s) = N
• for A ∈ Γ,K(s|aA) ≤ ε1N
• for B /∈ Γ,K(s)−K(s|aB) = I(s : aB) ≤ ε2N
We reuse the template of almost-perfect secret sharing, this time in the Kolmogorov setting using the
above version of secret sharing scheme. Thus, it should make sense to talk about almost-perfect secret
sharing in the sense of Kolmogorov.
It turns out that problems of constructing approximately perfect secret sharing schemes in Shannon’s
and Kolmogorov’s frameworks are closely related. For every access structure, in both frameworks the
asymptotically optimal rates are equal to each other. More precisely, we have the following equivalence:
Theorem 3.2. Let Γ be an access structure over n participants and ρ be a positive real, then the following
are equivalent:
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• Γ can be almost-perfectly implemented with parameters (ρ, ε1, ε2) in the sense of Shannon.
• Γ can be almost-perfectly implemented with parameters (ρ, ε1, ε2) in the sense of Kolmogorov.
This theorem follows from a more general parallelism between Shannon entropy and Kolmogorov
complexity. Below we explain this parallelism in terms of realizable complexity and entropy profiles.
The Kolmogorov complexity profile of a tuple [a] = (a1, . . . , an) of a binary string is defined by the
vector ~K([a]) of Kolmogorov complexities of all pairs, triples . . . of strings ai. So, it consists consists of
2n − 1 (integer) complexity values, one for each non-empty subset of n strings ai. In the same way we
define the entropy profile ~H([s]) of a tuple [s] = (s1, . . . , sn) of random variables by replacing K(·) by
H(·).
Next theorem explains that the class of realizable complexity profiles and the class of entropy profiles
are in some sense very similar:
Theorem 3.3. For every ~v ∈ R2
n−1
+ the following conditions are equivalent:
• there is a sequence ([sm])m∈N of n-tuple of random variables s.t.
1
m
~H([sm])→ ~v
• there is a sequence ([am])m∈N of n-tuple of binary strings s.t.
1
m
~K([am])→ ~v
Note that Theorem 3.5 follows immediately from Theorem 3.6.
We denote "the" Kolmogorov complexity function by the letter K. Since most variants are equal
up to a logarithmic term and our results are asymptotic. For a complete introduction to Kolmogorov
complexity and to some techniques used here, we refer the reader to the book [15] and to [21].
The problem of secret sharing could be studied also in the framework of the algorithmic information
theory. The idea is that now a secret sharing scheme is not a distribution on binary strings but an
individual tuple of binary strings with corresponding properties of “secrecy”. To define these “secrecy”
properties for individual strings, we substitute Shannon’s entropy by Kolmogorov complexity and get
algorithmic counterparts of the definition of secret sharing schemes. A similar idea was realized in
Definition 21 (part 1) in [1] for a special case (for threshold access structures).
For Kolmogorov complexity there is no natural way to define an "absolutely" perfect version of secret
sharing scheme. Thus, in the framework of Kolmogorov complexity we can deal only with “approximately-
perfect” versions of the definition. We define approximately-perfect secret sharing schemes for Kol-
mogorov complexity just in the same way as we defined (ε1, ε2)-nonperfect schemes for Shannon’s entropy
(similarly to Definition 2.2):
Definition 3.4. For an access structure Γ we say that a tuple of binary strings (s, a1, . . . , an) is a
Kolmogorov (ε1, ε2)-perfect secret sharing scheme for secrets of size N if
• K(s) = N
• for A ∈ Γ,K(s|aA) ≤ ε1N
• for B /∈ Γ,K(s)−K(s|aB) = I(s : aB) ≤ ε2N
We reuse the template of almost-perfect secret sharing, this time in the Kolmogorov setting using the
above version of secret sharing scheme. Thus, it should make sense to talk about almost-perfect secret
sharing in the sense of Kolmogorov.
It turns out that problems of constructing approximately perfect secret sharing schemes in Shannon’s
and Kolmogorov’s frameworks are closely related. For every access structure, in both frameworks the
asymptotically optimal rates are equal to each other. More precisely, we have the following equivalence:
Theorem 3.5. Let Γ be an access structure over n participants and ρ be a positive real, then the following
are equivalent:
• Γ can be almost-perfectly implemented with parameters (ρ, ε1, ε2) in the sense of Shannon.
• Γ can be almost-perfectly implemented with parameters (ρ, ε1, ε2) in the sense of Kolmogorov.
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This theorem follows from a more general parallelism between Shannon entropy and Kolmogorov
complexity. Below we explain this parallelism in terms of realizable complexity and entropy profiles.
The Kolmogorov complexity profile of a tuple [a] = (a1, . . . , an) of a binary string is defined by the
vector ~K([a]) of Kolmogorov complexities of all pairs, triples . . . of strings ai. So, it consists consists of
2n − 1 (integer) complexity values, one for each non-empty subset of n strings ai. In the same way we
define the entropy profile ~H([s]) of a tuple [s] = (s1, . . . , sn) of random variables by replacing K(·) by
H(·).
Next theorem explains that the class of realizable complexity profiles and the class of entropy profiles
are in some sense very similar:
Theorem 3.6. For every ~v ∈ R2
n−1
+ the following conditions are equivalent:
• there is a sequence ([sm])m∈N of n-tuple of random variables s.t.
1
m
~H([sm])→ ~v
• there is a sequence ([am])m∈N of n-tuple of binary strings s.t.
1
m
~K([am])→ ~v
Note that Theorem 3.5 follows immediately from Theorem 3.6.
Proof. To prove this result, we convert a sequence of n-tuple of random variables into a sequence
of n-tuple of binary strings and visa-versa; these conversions will preserve complexity/entropy profiles:
corresponding tuples of random variables and strings will have similar values in their profiles.
The main technical tools are the Kolmogorov–Levin theorem
K(a, b) = K(a) +K(b|a) +O(log |ab|)
and the “typization” trick for entropy and Kolmogorov complexity (the same technique as in [10, 18]).
[Kolmogorov → Shannon] Let [a] = (a1, . . . , an) be an n-tuple of binary strings. For a non-negative
integer c (to be fixed below) we consider the following set:
Tc([a]) = {[a
′] = (a′1, . . . , a
′
n) : ∀U ⊆ [1, . . . , n],K(aU )− c log |a| ≤ K(a
′
U ) ≤ K(aU )} ,
which is the set of n-tuples of binary strings whose complexity profile is close to the one of [a] up to a
logarithmic term. Further we formulate several properties of Tc([a]).
Claim 3.7. log#Tc([a]) = 2
K(a)−O(logK(a)) for all large enough c.
Proof. See Lemma 2 in [10] and Proposition 1 in [18]. We fix value c so that Claim 3.7 holds (c
depends on the size n of the tuple but not on K(a)).
Claim 3.8. ∀a′ ∈ Tc(a), ∀U, V ⊆ [1, . . . , n],K(a
′
U |a
′
V ) = K(aU |aV )−O(log |a|)
Proof. Follows from the definition of Tc(a) and the Kolmogorov–Levin theorem.
Now, define [s] = (s1, . . . , sn) as an n-tuple of random variables uniformly distributed on Tc([a]).
From the definition of [s] and Claim 3.7 it follows that entropy of all [s] is close to K(a). We claim
that in fact all components of the entropy profile of [s] are close to the corresponding components in the
complexity profile of [a]. We prove this property in two steps. At first, we obtain /Can upper bound:
Claim 3.9. ∀U ⊆ [1, . . . , n], H(sU ) ≤ K(aU ) + 1
Proof. The number of possible values for sU is the number of possible substrings a
′
U for a
′ ∈ T (a).
Since K(a′U ) ≤ K(aU ), there is at most 2
K(aU )+1− 1 such values for sU . Shannon’s entropy of a random
variable cannot be greater than logarithm of the number of its values, and we are done.
Further, we prove the lower bound:
Claim 3.10. ∀U ⊆ [1, . . . , n], H(sU ) ≥ K(aU )−O(log |a|)
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Proof. First, consider a′U for some fixed a
′ ∈ T (a). From Claim 3.8, K(a′
U
|a′U ) ≤ K(aU |aU ) +
O(log |a|), thus sU can take at most 2
K(aU |aU )+O(log |a|) values. This is true for all such a′U , therefore
H(sU |sU ) ≤ K(aU |aU ) +O(log |a|).
Then,
H(sU ) = H(s)−H(sU |sU ) (equality for entropy)
≥ K(a)−K(aU |aU )−O(log |a|) (by definition of s)
≥ K(aU )−O(log |a|) (from symmetry of information)
Therefore, the random variable [s] has an entropy profile close to the complexity profile of [a] up to
a logarithmic factor. The first part for the theorem is proven.
[Shannon → Kolmogorov] Let s = (s1, . . . , sn) be a n-tuple of random variables. We fix an integer
M > 0 (to be specified below) and construct some M × n table
a11a
2
2 . . . a
M
1
a12a
2
2 . . . a
M
2
...
a1na
2
n . . . a
M
n
satisfying the following properties:
(a) The columns of the table (each column is an n-vector) consist of possible values for the random
variable [s].
(b) Different n-tuples are used as columns in the matrix with different frequencies; we require that each
frequency is close to the corresponding probability in the distribution of [s]. More precisely, for every
n-tuple of letters (α1, . . . , αn)
the column


α1
α2
...
αn

 should occur in the table Prob[s = (α1, . . . , αn)] ·M +O(1) times.
(c) The table has the maximal Kolmogorov complexity among all tables satisfying (a) and (b). It implies,
by a rather simple counting argument, that
K(a) ≥M ·H(s)−O(logM)
Denote ai = a
1
i . . . a
M
i for all i = 1 . . . n (i.e., we set ai to be the row i of the table.) Let us verify
that the n-tuple of binary strings a = (a1, . . . , an) has a complexity profile close to the entropy profile of
s multiplied by M .
Claim 3.11. ∀U ⊆ [1, . . . , n],K(aU ) ≤M ·H(sU ) +O(logM)
Proof. We extract from the entire table the rows corresponding to U ; count frequencies of different
columns (of size |U |) that occur in this restricted table (of size |U | ×M). Denote these frequencies by
f1, f2, . . . (of course, the sum of all frequencies equals 1). Let h be the entropy of the distribution with
probabilities f1, f2, . . .. By Theorem 5.1 in [21],
K(aU ) ≤M · h+O(logM).
Further, we use the fact that frequencies fj are close to the corresponding probabilities of su:
h = −
∑
i fi log fi
= −
∑
i (pi +O(
1
M )) log(pi[1 +O(
1
piM
)])
≤ H(sU ) +O(
1
M )
We get the claim by combining the two inequalities.
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Claim 3.12. ∀U, V ⊆ [1, . . . , n],K(aU |aV ) ≤M ·H(sU |sV ) +O(logM)
Proof. Denote aV = a
1
V . . . a
M
V . We split all positions i = 1 . . .M into classes corresponding to
different values of aiV . Denote the sizes of these classes by m1,m1, . . . By property (c) of the table, each
mj must be proportional to the corresponding probability: the number mj of positions i = 1, . . . ,M
such that aiV = α¯j is equal to
Prob[sv = α¯j ] ·M +O(1).
Given aV , we describe aU by an encoding a
i
U separately for different classes of positions corresponding
to different values of aiV . Similarly to the previous Claim, we get
K(aU |aV ) ≤
∑
j
[mjH(sU |sV = α¯j) +O(logmj)]
where mj is the number of columns c of the table where a
c
V = α¯j . It follows that
K(aU |aV ) ≤M
∑
j
mj
M
H(sU |sV = αj) +O(logM) = M ·H(sU |sV ) +O(logM)
Claim 3.13. ∀U, V ⊆ [1, . . . , n],K(aU |aV ) ≥M ·H(sU |sV )−O(log |a|)
Proof.
K(aU |aV ) = K(a)−K(aV )−O(log |a|) by Kolmogorov-Levin Theorem
≥ MH(s)−MH(sV )−O(log |a|) by (c) and previous claim
≥ MH(sU |sV )− O(log |a|) Shannon information equality
Thus, we have constructed a n-tuple of binary strings [a] whose complexity profile is close to M times
the entropy profile of [s], up to some logarithmic term.
4 Scaling of secret sharing schemes
Here, we attempt to show how to scale up and down any secret sharing scheme. The problem consist of,
given a secret sharing for N -bit secrets, constructing new secret sharing schemes for ℓ-bit secrets where
ℓ can be arbitrary large or small. While this task is easy in the perfect case, it becomes much more
difficult in the non-perfect case when we are concerned with efficiency and information leak.
4.1 Scaling for perfect schemes
We present some easy construction for scaling up and down in the perfect case and state what they
achieve in terms of efficiency (size of the shares).
Proposition 4.1. Let Γ be an access structure and Σ be a PS(Γ, N, S) then
(a) [scaling down] For every positive integer ℓ ≤ N there exists a PS(Γ, ℓ, S)
(b) [scaling up] For every positive integer q there exists a PS(Γ, qN, qS)
Proof.
(a) To scale down, we can reuse the same scheme. Simply restrict the support of the random variable
k to 2ℓ values and equip this support with the uniform distribution. Authorized groups can determine
the secret uniquely since it was the case in the initial scheme. Forbidden have no information about the
secret otherwise they had some information in the initial perfect scheme.
(b) For scaling up, the new scheme consists of the concatenation of q independent versions of the
initial scheme. Since the new scheme consists of independent copies (a serialization) of the initial scheme,
every new entropy value is q times the old entropy value.
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4.2 Scaling for non-perfect schemes
Scaling up for nonperfect schemes is similar to the case of perfect schemes.
Proposition 4.2. Let Γ be an access structure and Σ be a ε-NPS(Γ, N, S) then for every non-negative
integer q there exists a qε-NPS(Γ, qN, qS)
Proof. Simply reuse the construction of (b) of proposition 4.1. Then a forbidden group can have at
most qε bits of information about the secret.
Scaling down of the size of the secret becomes non-trivial for non-perfect secret sharing schemes if
we want to keep the same information leak and missing information. If we can ε-nonperfectly share an
N -bit secret, then intuitively it seems that we should be able to share one single bit with information leak
ratio of about ε. However this statement is quite non-obvious. Now we formulate and prove a slightly
weaker statement (it is the most technical result of this paper):
Theorem 4.3. For all c ∈ (0, 14 ) there exists an integer N0 > 0 such that for every access structure Γ
on n participants. If for some ε there exist a ε-NPS(Γ, N, S) where the secret is uniformly distributed,
such that
• nS < 2cN
• N > N0
there exists a ε′-NPS(Γ, 1, S) with ε′ = 8ε
2
3 , where the secret is uniformly distributed
Sketch of the proof: Construct a new scheme for a 1-bit secret from the initial scheme in the following
way. Given a ε-NPS(Γ, N, S) for a uniformly distributed secret in K = {1, . . . , 2N}, take a splitting of
K into two equal parts, say K0 and K1. Then define a new scheme as follows: to share the bit i, take
a random element of Ki and share it with the initial scheme. It is easy to see that this new scheme is
indeed a ε′-NPS(Γ, 1, S) for a uniformly distributed secret bit with some leak ε′. This leak ε′ depends
on the initial choice of the splitting K0. We will show that there exists one such splitting for which the
leak is small.
We first prove a general lemma about discrete random variables.
Lemma 4.4. Let X be a finite discrete random variable over a k-element set A (with k even) such that
H(X) ≥ log k−δ for some positive δ. Let B be a random subset of A of size k/2 (B is chosen uniformly,
i.e., each (k/2)-element subset of A is chosen with probability 1/
(
k
k/2
)
). Then for every γ ∈ (0, 1), with
probability at least
1− 2e
− 4τ
2
kγ2
(probability for a random choice of B) we have
‖Pr[X ∈ B]−
1
2
‖ ≤ 2τ
(probability for the initial distribution X), where τ = 1+δ2 log γk .
(In applications of this lemma we will choose the most reasonable values of parameter γ.)
Proof. For each element x ∈ A, denote by ρx the non-negative weight (probability) that X assigns
to x. Using this notation we have
H(X) =
∑
x∈A
−ρx log ρx
A randomly chosen B contains exactly one half of the points x from A. We need to estimate the sum of
ρx for all x ∈ B. We do it separately for “rather large” ρx and for “rather small” ρx. To make this idea
more precise, fix a threshold γ > 0 that separates “rather large” and “rather small” values of ρx. Denote
by pγ the total measure of all ρx that are greater than this threshold. More formally,
pγ =
∑
ρx>γ
ρx
We claim that pγ is rather small. Indeed, if we need to identify some x ∈ A, we should specify the
following information which consists of two parts:
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1. We say whether px > γ or not (one bit of information).
2a. If px > γ, we specify the ordinal number of this “large” point; there are at most 1/γ points x
′ such
that ρx′ > γ, so we need at most log(1/γ) bits of information;
2b. otherwise, px ≤ γ, we simply specify the ordinal number of x in A; here we need at most log k bits
of information.
From the standard coding argument we get
H(X) ≤ 1 + pγ log(1/γ) + (1− pγ) log k
Since H(X) ≥ log k − δ, it follows that pγ ≤
1+δ
log(γk) .
Thus, we may assume that total measure of “rather large” values ρx is quite small even in the entire
set A; hence, “large” points do not affect seriously the measure of a randomly chosen B. It remains to
estimate the typical impact of “small” ρx to the weight of B.
Technically, it is useful to forget about “large” points x (substitute weights ρx > γ by 0) and denote
ρ′x =
{
ρx if ρx ≤ γ
0 otherwise
Now we choose exactly k/2 different elements from A and estimate the sum of the corresponding ρ′x.
Note that expectation of this sum is one half of the sum of ρ′x for all x ∈ A, i.e, (1 − pγ)/2. It remains
to estimate the deviation of this sum from its expectation. We use the version of Hoeffding’s bound for
samplings without replacement, which can be used to estimate deviations for a sampling of k/2 points
from a k-elements set, ([?][section 6]). The probability of the event that the sum exceeds expected value
plus some τ can be bounded as follows:
Pr[
∑
x∈B
ρ′x ≥ (1− pγ)/2 + τ ] ≤ e
− 2τ
2
|B|γ2 = e
− 4τ
2
kγ2
Together with “large” values ρx we have
Pr[
∑
x∈B
ρx ≥ (1 − pγ)/2 + τ + pγ ] ≤ e
− 4τ
2
kγ2
Now we fix the parameter τ to be equal to one half of the upper bound for pγ , i.e., τ =
1+δ
2 log(γk) . It
follows that,
Pr[
∑
x∈B
ρx ≥ 1/2 + 2τ ] ≤ e
− 4τ
2
kγ2
From this bound, we can deduce the symmetric bound for the sum of ρx in A \B:
Pr[
∑
x∈A\B
ρx ≤ 1/2− 2τ ] ≤ e
− 4τ
2
kγ2
Since A \B and B share the same distribution (the uniform one), this bound also holds for B. Sum up
the two bounds and we are done.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 4.3.
Proof. (of Theorem 4.3). Let K0 be a random subset of the set of all secrets K such that |K0| = 2
N−1.
K0 is chosen uniformly over all possible such fair splittings of K. If κ be the random variable for the
N -bit secret in the initial scheme, let us define the new secret bit ξ as the bit defined by "κ ∈ K0" (ξ is
indeed a bit since H(ξ) = 1). Our goal is to estimate H(ξ|σB) for any B /∈ Γ be a forbidden group, and
show it is large. Formally, we want to show that H(ξ|σB) ≥ 1− ε
′ where ε′ = 8ε
2
3 .
First, we notice that for any bit ξ constructed as above, I(ξ : σB) ≤ ε holds for all B /∈ Γ, so we can
assume that ε′ ≤ ε, i.e,
ε′ ≥
83
N2
(1)
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We know that H(κ|σB) is rather large. More precisely,
H(κ|σB) ≥ N(1− ε)
We introduce some positive parameter δ (to be fixed later) to separate all values of σB into two classes:
more typical values b such that H(κ|σB = b) ≥ N(1− δ)
and
less typical values b such that H(κ|σB = b) < N(1− δ)
Since the entropy H(κ|σB) is large, the total measure of all “less typical” values b is rather small
(more precisely, it is not greater than εδ ). We do not care about the conditional entropy of ξ when b is
non-typical (the total weight of these b is so small that they do not contribute essentially to H(ξ|σB)).
We focus on the contribution of H(ξ|σB = b) for a typical value b. To estimate this quantity we apply
lemma 4.4 to the distribution k conditional to σB = b, it follows that
H(ξ|σB = b) ≥ h(1/2 + 2τ) ≥ 1− 16τ
2 with probability 1− 2e
− 4τ
2
γ2
2−N
for some new parameter γ > 0 and τ = 1+δN2(log γ+N) .
This inequality true for all forbidden group B and any typical share b. Thus if we sum up the bad
events, we obtain that the following estimation for H(ξ|σB):
H(ξ|σB) =
∑
b∈SB
Pr[σB = b]H(ξ|σB = b)
≥
∑
typical b
Pr[σB = b]H(ξ|σB = b)
≥ (1−
ε
δ
)(1 − 16τ2)
≥ 1−
ε
δ
− 16τ2
holds with probability at least
1− |Γ||SP |2e
− 4τ
2
γ2
2−N
(2)
where SP is the set of all possible shares given to the group of all participants.
Now, we choose our parameters γ and δ to deduce our result and show that our choice is valid. We
take
16τ2 =
ε
δ
=
1
2
ε′ = 4ε
2
3 (3)
Under these conditions
log γ = −N
[
1−
1
8
(
ε′
εN
+ 2
)]
(4)
and
H(ξ|B) ≥ 1− 8ε
2
3 = 1− ε′
We want to find a simple sufficient condition that guarantees that the probability (2) is non-negative.
To this end we do some (rather boring) calculations. We take the required inequality and reduce it step
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by step to a weaker but more suitable form:
|Γ||SP |2e
− 4τ
2
γ2
2−N
< 1 that is what we need, see (2)
|Γ||SP | < 2e
4τ2
γ2
2−N
2n2nS < 2e
4τ2
γ2
2−N
trivial upper bounds for |Γ| and |SP |
2n(S+1) < 2
4τ2
γ2
2−N
since e > 2
n(S + 1) < 4τ
2
γ2 2
−N by applying log
2nS < 4τ
2
γ2 2
−N since S ≥ 1
2nS < ε
′
8 2
N(1− 1
4
( ε
′
εN
+2)) from (3) and (4)
nS < ε′2
1
4
N−4 since ε′ ≤ εN
2cN < ε′2
1
4
N−4 by assumption
1 < ε′2(
1
4
−c)N−4
0 < (14 − c)N + log ε
′ − 4
0 < (14 − c)N − 2 logN + 5 from (1)
The last inequality (which is a sufficient condition for (2) to be non-negative) holds when c < 14 and
N > N0 for some large enough N0 depending on c.
Notice that in this case we consider schemes where the secret is uniformly distributed since the
dependency on the probability distribution of the secret is not trivial in the nonperfect case. Sharing
exactly one bit instead of N seems more difficult. We do not know whether this bound can be improved,
in particular, can we achieve a leak of O(ε) ? The assumption nS = O(2N ) points out that the result
holds for various kind of access structures defined by some trade-off between the number of participants
n and the size of the shares S of a scheme for N -bit secrets.
5 Conclusion
In this article we introduced several definitions of almost-perfect secret sharing schemes (two versions in
the framework of Shannon’s entropy and another version in the framework of Kolmogorov complexity).
We proved that all these approaches are asymptotically equivalent (have equivalent asymptotical rates
of schemes for each access structure). This means that we can combine tools of Shannon’s information
theory and Kolmogorov complexity to investigate the properties of approximately-perfect secret sharing.
The major questions remain open. The most important one is to understand: can almost perfect
secret sharing schemes achieve substantially better information rates than perfect (in classic sense) secret
sharing schemes? The known proofs of lower bounds for the rate of perfect secret sharing schemes are
based on combinations of information inequalities; so it is not hard to check that the same type of
arguments imply the same kind of bounds for almost perfect schemes. Thus, the problem of separating
the information rates for almost-perfect and exactly perfect schemes looks rather hard.
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